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MagicBlock exposes randomness through VRF Program – a Solana VRF implementation that uses a network of oracles to compute and verify random values. The protocol follows RFC 9381, leveraging Curve25519’s Ristretto group and Schnorr‑style signatures for proofs. See the Technical Details page for integration specifics. Upon randomness request, the VRF program computes a unique hashId from various inputs and stores it in the onchain oracle queue: 
    let combined_hash = hashv(&[
        &args.caller_seed,
        &slot.to_le_bytes(),
        &slothash,
        &args.callback_discriminator,
        &args.callback_program_id.to_bytes(),
        &time.to_le_bytes(),
        &idx.to_le_bytes(),
    ]);
Verified oracles sign the unique queue items with their private key, the resulted signature or randomness proof is verifiable onchain: The randomness proof is cryptographically bound to the input caller_seed and to MagicBlock’s VRF signer identity. Your callback enforces this with: 
#[account(address = ephemeral_vrf_sdk::consts::VRF_PROGRAM_IDENTITY)]
pub vrf_program_identity: Signer<'info>,
Only the official MagicBlock oracle can trigger the callback, preventing spoofed or manipulated results. Invalid proofs automatically fail, and other programs cannot front‑run the request. EphemeralVrf checks for conditions like InvalidProof and Unauthorized so incorrect signatures or unauthorized callers are rejected before your game logic runs.